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Abstract 
Purpose - This paper examines value gains to acquirers in large commercial bank mega-
mergers (with transaction values over £1 billion) that occurred in the European Union during 
the period 1997-2007, distinguishing between domestic and cross-border transactions.  
 
Design/methodology/approach - Based on a sample of 62 bank mega-mergers, an event 
study methodology is employed using a market model to determine cumulative standardised 
abnormal returns (CSAR) to acquiring banks around the announcement date of merger deals. 
This is followed by cross-sectional regression to determine specific characteristics driving 
acquirers’ CSAR. 
 
Findings - Cross-border bank mergers have been more frequent in recent years, reflecting a 
growing trend of banking sector consolidation in the EU.  However, such mergers are found 
to yield significant negative announcement period acquirer returns, while domestic deals have 
marginally negative but insignificant returns.  The operational cost efficiency and capital 
strength of acquiring banks are found to be significant in influencing excess returns. 
 
Research limitations/Implications - Constraints on data availability limited the scope for 
sensitivity analysis and incorporation of target characteristics in the cross-sectional regression 
of drivers affecting acquirers’ CSAR.  Further research is aimed to address these issues. 
 
Practical Implications - Event study and regression results indicate that potential downside 
risks are judged by market participants to outweigh the benefits from cross-border M&As in 
the retail banking market despite evidence of increased financial sector consolidation in the 
EU. 
 
Originality/Value - The study reflects the recent period of increased cross-border banking 
consolidation in the EU and reveals findings that differ in some respects from previous 
studies on EU bank M&As. 
 
Keywords: European Union; Banking, megamergers, domestic, cross border; standardized 
abnormal returns 
Paper Type: Research Paper 
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1. Introduction 
This paper uses event-study methodology to determine announcement period abnormal 
returns to acquirers in bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that occurred in the European 
Union (EU) over the period 1997-2007.  In line with previous studies for EU banks (e.g. 
Tourani-Rad and Van Beek, 1999; Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000), we distinguish between 
domestic and cross-border M&As, but focus principally on acquirers associated with large 
commercial bank transactions with values over £1bn.  Our analysis reflects a period of 
structural change in the EU banking industry which has undergone significant consolidation 
leading to a sizable reduction in the number of banks, as a result of the development of the 
single financial market and the introduction of the Euro.  However, in the early years of the 
single market banking groups in the EU responded to deregulatory measures by involving 
mainly in domestic M&As trying to consolidate their positions within national borders to face 
a more competitive environment (Campa and Hernando, 2006).  Reducing further legal and 
regulatory barriers to cross-border banking consolidation has therefore been one of the policy 
priorities of the European Commission (2005) towards development of the single market for 
financial services.  In response to these measures designed to facilitate greater integration of 
retail banking markets in the EU, the European Central Bank (ECB, 2008) reports a growing 
trend in the number and value of cross-border deals relative to domestic transactions.  This 
development in general reflects increased concentration in local banking markets and a desire 
to pursue an expansionary strategy to gain access in a larger geographical market as a result 
of greater integration of the European economy (Hernando et al, 2009). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse shareholder value gains to acquirers as a result of 
these developments leading to greater domestic and cross-border banking consolidation in the 
EU.  Our study adds to the limited but growing body of evidence on shareholder wealth 
implications for EU bank M&As by reflecting a longer and more recent period of 
consolidation in the EU banking industry.  We concentrate on EU bank mega-mergers (with 
deal values above £1bn) to ensure that the average acquiring bank is of roughly similar size in 
domestic and cross-border deals, thus allowing comparisons on a like-for-like basis. 
Furthermore, we employ an event study methodology to compute cumulative standardised 
abnormal returns (CSAR) where the abnormal returns are weighted by their standard 
deviations. This contrasts with the more conventional approach of using standard abnormal 
returns (AR) in comparing shareholder value.  We consider that the use of the CSAR is 
justified because of the discrepancy associated with the different degree of event impact in 
different geographical markets.  Our results show that acquisition announcements are 
generally associated with loss of value for the acquiring banks, which are quite significant in 
cross-border M&As. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
The literature examining shareholder wealth associated with bank M&As suggests that 
financial markets are skeptical about potential value gains upon announcement. Most of the 
US studies analysing bank mergers find that targets generally gain at the expense of the 
acquirers, while the combined entities experience insignificant wealth changes (Hawawini 
and Swary, 1990; Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; Kane, 2000).   Some studies, however, find 
that announcement of bank M&As neither creates nor destroys shareholder value (Hannan 
and Wolken, 1989; Pilloff and Santomero, 1998), while others find that announcements of 
certain types of bank M&As do create value.  For example, DeLong (2001, 2003) reports 
negative returns for US bank acquirers, but also find positive combined returns for bank 
mergers that are both activity and geographically diversifying. The reason for this finding is 
that the market prices each type of risks differently and will expect a higher return on 
diversifying mergers than on mergers where both partners engage in similar types of 
activities. 
 
The existing literature on EU bank merger activity is broadly consistent with the US literature 
in that the target bank’s shareholders experience positive abnormal returns. However, results 
for the acquiring bank’s shareholders seem to vary but mostly they are not significantly 
different from zero.  Tourani-Rad and Van Beek (1999), analyzing a sample of 17 targets and 
56 bidding financial institutions (not just banks) find that target shareholders experience 
positive abnormal returns while the returns to bidders are insignificant.  They also find that 
cross-border mergers do not yield returns that are significantly different from domestic ones.  
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) study 54 large European financial deals (including 18 cross-
border) between 1988 and 1997 and find positive and significant average returns around the 
time of announcement. Furthermore, they find that only domestic deals create shareholder 
value while cross-border deals reveal positive but insignificant abnormal returns.  They show 
that the difference in the results between domestic/cross-border deals is not driven by 
country-specific effects and their value creating result for domestic deals is attributed to a 
sub-sample of mergers between banks and product diversification of banks into insurance.  
Scholtens and de Wit (2001) compare shareholder wealth effects of bank mergers in Europe 
to the US and Japan.  For Europe, they examine a sample of 17 targets and 20 bidders using 
event study methodology with a 31-day window, and find that targets realize positive excess 
returns while the returns to bidders are small, but also significant and positive.  Campa and 
Hernando (2006) look at M&A transactions in the EU financial industry in the period 1998-
2002 and find that shareholder returns are positive for targets and slightly negative for 
acquirers upon announcement of transactions.  More recently, Hagendorff et al (2008) 
analyse the value effects of large banks merger announcements in Europe (in relation to US) 
and find that acquirers realise a higher return in Europe than in the US. This is explained by 
the existence of low protection economies prevalent in Europe than the US. 
 
Other studies for Europe focusing on the distinction between domestic and cross-border 
mergers have also expressed differing opinions on wealth implications.  Beitel et al. (2004) 
examine the value implications of 98 large bank M&A transactions between 1987 and 2000 
and find that the overall returns are higher for non-diversifying transactions, particularly by 
domestic bidders who are involved in previously less merger activities and when the targets 
show poor past performance. Using regression analyses, they also test different value drivers 
regarding their influence on the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Their findings indicate 
that cross-border deals seem to increase the CAR of the target bank, while the bidders create 
more value in domestic transactions. Campa and Hernando (2004) look at financial and non-
financial M&A transactions over the period 1998-2000 and find that, in the case of cross-
border deals, both targets and acquirers receive significantly lower cumulative abnormal 
returns. However, they report larger value creation from domestic mergers in a regulated (e.g. 
financial) industry. 
 
Some studies that distinguish between domestic and cross border transactions have also 
investigated the scope for value gains from geographical or product/activity diversification.  
The evidence for European banks M&As is generally mixed.  Lepetit et al (2004) examine 
value gains from bank M&As between 1991 and 2001 covering 13 European countries and 
find positive gains for targets, as well as for transactions involving cross-product 
diversification and geographic specialization. Ismail and Davidson (2005) find higher 
abnormal returns in bank-to-bank compared to cross-product deals, and mixed evidence of 
abnormal returns in domestic and cross border deals, thus providing weak support for 
geographical diversification.  Lensink and Maslennikova (2007), analysing value gains to 
acquirers based on a sample of 75 banks from 19 European countries (1996-2004) find value 
gains in domestic and cross-border deals, although gains to diversifying cross-border deals 
are insignificant.  Finally, Ongena and Penas (2008) investigate the determinants of 
bondholders’ wealth effects of acquirers in domestic and cross border European banks 
mergers in the periods 1998 -2002 and conclude that the abnormal returns to domestic 
bondholders is higher than those of the cross border banks.  Their study also indicates that 
banks’ bondholders experience abnormal returns of up to 5% higher than those participating 
in the cross-border mergers when the acquirers’ country has a stringent policy of banking 
regulations. 
 
 
3. Methodology  
This study adopts the event study methodology using a market model with an estimation 
period of 100 days and a window of (-30, +30) days around the announcement date to 
determine the abnormal returns to shareholders. The analysis is conducted for both the 
domestic and cross-border transactions in the sample.  
Event study literature offers little by way of consensus on the length of the event window and 
the judgement is often based on data availability and sampling considerations.  Some studies 
have adopted short event windows of 1-5 days (Andrade et al., 2001; Mulherin and Boone, 
2000; Campa and Hernando, 2004, 2006).  Others consider a longer window which takes into 
consideration possible bid revisions and competitions (Conn et al, 2005), thus ensuring that 
leakage of information (rumour and news) and the reaction of the market that may influence 
the abnormal returns are captured.  A handful of bank M&A studies have used long event 
windows in estimating abnormal returns. Scholtens and de Wit (2001) and Lepetit et al 
(2004) applied a 31 day event window, while Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) and Lensink 
and Maslennikova (2007) considered windows of up to 41 days.  The use of even longer 
windows seems to be more common in non-financial studies. For example, Black et al 
(2003), Gregory and McCorrison (2004) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) applied 
windows of 61 days, while Lowinski et al (2004) used a slightly longer window of 63 days.  
In a study of UK domestic and cross-border mergers, Aw and Chatterjee (2004) suggest a 
longer window and estimation period to ensure that there are sufficient observations for 
statistical accuracy without running any risk of being far from the test period.   
 Consistent with most previous studies in the literature we estimate abnormal returns (AR) 
using the market model: 
)ˆˆ( mtjjjtjt RRAR    
where ARjt = abnormal return on share j for each day t in the event window; Rjt  = actual 
return on share j for each day t in the event window; Rmt = return on the market m for each 
day t in the event window; jˆ  and jˆ  
are the intercept and slope estimates of the market 
model over the estimation period.
 
 
The AR was standardised to cater for the different degree of event impact. This is done by 
weighing the abnormal returns by the standard deviation. The purpose of the standardization 
is to ensure that each abnormal return has the same variance (Serra, 2002).  Thus, by dividing 
each firm’s abnormal residual by the standard deviation over the estimation period, each 
residual has an estimated variance of 1 and thus defined by the equation: 
 =   
where: SARjt = standardised abnormal return for firm j at time t ; √S
2
ARjt  =  standard 
deviation of the AR for the firm j at the time t. The variance of ARjt is given by the formula:  
 
 
 
where:  = AR for firm j at time i over the 100 day estimation period; Dj = number 
of observed trading day returns for firm j over the estimation period; Rmt (event window) = return 
on the market at time t over the event window; Rm (est. period) = mean return on the market at 
time t over the estimation period; Rmt (est. period) = return on the market at time t over the 
estimation period.  
Finally, the cumulative standardized abnormal returns (CSARs) are calculated for the relevant 
windows around the period of acquisition and aggregated over the sample of banks to 
ascertain the abnormal share price effect:  
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where the window begins at T − z days and lasts until T + x days, T being the day of the 
acquisition announcement, and N is the cross-section sample size. To determine the 
significance of the standardized abnormal returns for each day in the event window 
aggregated across the sample, the Z-statistics is employed given by 
                                                                 
where  = Total (aggregated) cross-sectional SAR for each day in the event window;  
= number of observed trading day returns for firm j over the estimation period, and N = 
number of banks in the sample. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Data  
The starting point in the data collection process was the compilation of a list of all large 
European Bank M&As in the Zephyr, Bankscope, Thompson Financial and Bankers Almanac 
databases. These were checked for consistency with a comprehensive list of large publicly 
traded bank M&As obtained from the Reuters database.   
 
In order to concentrate on mega-M&As, we eliminated all transactions worth less than £1 
billion. The sample was restricted to completed, commercial bank to bank transactions. Only 
bank targets and acquirers within the EU were selected since large M&As have been higher 
in the EU than elsewhere in the world including the US (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000). 
Availability of relevant share prices and accounting data in Bankscope relating to M&As 
events over the years 1997-2007 restricted our final sample to 62 transactions.  To estimate 
the market model we sourced daily share prices from Yahoo Finance and collected the data 
for at least 100 days before and 60 days after the announcement date of each transaction.  
Table 1 shows the number of transactions and the average deal values in the sample by year.  
 
<<Table 1 here>> 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, M&A activity among banks has been more significant in recent 
years, with the highest number of transactions reaching a peak during 2004 with average 
value in excess of £17 billion.  Figure 1 presents the geographical distribution across the 
European countries.
1
  Italy tops the table with a total of 17 deals followed by France and 
Spain with 10 each.  Of the 62 bank mega-M&As, 19 (31%) are domestic and (43) 69% are 
cross border, which are mostly among the developed economies of the EU.  This shows that 
while the general trend of consolidation in the European banking market has been towards 
domestic M&As leading to “domestic champions” (European Commission, 2005), among the 
bank mega-M&As cross border deals have been higher in number (and volume) than 
domestic deals.  Our finding is consistent with the recent trend reported by the European 
Central Bank (ECB, 2008), which highlights an increase in cross-border mergers relative to 
domestic deals.  Specifically, the report shows that the value of cross-border deals has been 
significantly larger than domestic deals in recent years, owing to financial sector integration 
and falling regulatory barriers across the EU countries. 
 
<<Figure 1 here>> 
 
In Table 2 we provide some key statistics to distinguish between the domestic and cross-
border M&As in the pre- and post-merger periods.  The key variables of interest are the 
return on total assets, return on equity, dividend payout, total assets, operating and staff costs, 
cost to income and total assets/equity ratios with descriptive statistics presented using 
averages over the period of years covering the pre and post merger periods.  The results show 
that the total assets for both the domestic and cross border samples rose significantly after the 
mergers, although not much difference is observed in the cost and capitalization ratios.  
However, cross-border acquirers increased their post-merger dividend payout by 29% while 
the domestic acquirers reduced their dividend by 57%.  This is consistent with the observed 
reduction in the post-merger profitability of the domestic acquirers, whereas the average 
profitability of cross-border acquirers rose slightly in the post-merger period. 
 
                                                   
1
The distribution for the cross-border deals in Figure 1 is based on both the acquiring and the target bank.  The 
sample includes, for example, domestic mega-mergers between Credit Lyonnais and Sacam Development in 
France (valued at US$50billion), National Westminster and Royal Bank of Scotland in UK (valued at US$39 
billion), Sanpaolo IMI SPA and Banca Intesa SpA in Italy (valued at US$31billion), and the cross border merger 
between Abbey National (UK) and Banco Santander Central Hispano SPA of Spain (valued at US$15billion). 
<<Table 2 here>> 
 
 
4.2 Event study results 
Using the event study methodology described above, we obtained the cumulative 
standardized abnormal returns (CSAR) for bank acquirers involved in domestic and cross-
border M&As using a window of [-30, +30] days around the announcement date.  The longer 
horizon window allows sufficient time for the effect of announcement to be absorbed in the 
market price, including any possible bid revisions and competitions (Conn et al, 2005).  
Choosing a long window carries the disadvantage that it could obscure the announcement 
effects where an acquirer is involved in more than one acquisition within the event window.  
However, none of the deals in our sample are less than three months apart, so the 61 day 
window seems appropriate. 
 
As explained above, the abnormal returns were standardized (using their respective standard 
deviations as weights) to cater for the different degree of event impact across the countries.  
The pattern of CSAR for the entire 61 days event window is depicted in Figure 2 for the 
cross-border acquirers and in Figure 3 for the domestic acquirers. The volatility of the returns 
is clearly apparent over a longer period event window, showing the uncertainly in the 
market’s response to price these events as news filter through before and after announcement 
date.  For the cross-border acquirers, the graph of CSAR (Figure 1) drops steep into negative 
after an initial rise and then rises again before falling back to roughly the same level just 
before announcement day. The CSAR was at peak of 29.02% on the 25
th
 day before falling to 
over -40% just before announcement, and remained negative after announcement reaching a 
peak of -41.5% on the 17th day.  For the domestic acquirers, in contrast, the graph of CSAR 
(Figure 2) shows a more sustained positive trend before and after announcement date.  The 
initial gain in CSAR before announcement is followed by a steady fall, which reverts to a 
steady gain after announcement before eventually steeping downwards.  However, none of 
the cumulative returns for domestic acquirers are significant.   
  
   <Figure 2 and 3 here > 
 
Figures 2 and 3 do not reflect the significance of CSARs but illustrate a contrast in the pattern 
of the returns between cross-border and domestic acquirers.  The cross border acquirers have 
higher positive returns before but also steeper negative returns before and after announcement 
date, revealing a greater degree of variability in the pattern of returns.  Table 3 shows the 
number of days in the event window for which cross border acquirers have statistically 
significant CSAR, based on the Z-statistic, with corresponding results of domestic acquirers 
shown in the parentheses.  Of the 23 days, 5 occurred before announcement (of which only 2 
are positive) while 18 occurred after announcement, all of them negative.  Domestic 
acquirers, in contrast, show no significant returns throughout the event window although on 
the whole there are more negative returns than positive. 
 
<<Table 3 here>> 
 
Some reasons can be adduced as to why there are more significant and negative abnormal 
returns for the cross border acquirers than for domestic acquirers.  In general, acquiring a 
foreign target may lead to lower wealth for the acquirer’s shareholders because of uncertainty 
surrounding the acquisition of the target.  For instance, differences in regulatory and 
accounting systems, as well as cultural differences among staff or lines of business, may 
negatively affect the potential for synergistic gains and undermine public confidence, which 
may adversely affect the share price of the acquiring bank.  On the other hand, domestic 
acquirers are adjudged to possess more knowledge of the local market than foreign acquirers. 
Das and Sengupta (2001) refer to the importance of asymmetric information as an 
underlining factor for the disparity in the wealth returns of the domestic and foreign 
acquirers.  As domestic banks are more likely to have better knowledge about the preferences 
of domestic consumers, their presence in related lines of activity places them in an 
advantageous position in the market than foreign acquirers, yielding the potential for greater 
synergistic gains.  In this sense, domestic bank M&As are perceived more favourably than 
cross-border ones from the perspective of the home market.   
 
 
4.3.   Regression Results 
We also examine the effect of specific financial factors on shareholder value for the acquiring 
banks.  The financial factors constitute standard measures of profitability (return on assets 
and return on equity) and efficiency in cost management (cost-to-income ratio and 
operational cost) to reflect the operating characteristics and management skills of acquiring 
banks in the valuation of M&As (e.g. Akhavien et al, 1997; Beital et al, 2004).  We also 
incorporate a measure of acquirer’s capital strength as captured by bank capitalisation 
(equity/assets), a measure of solvency (income/assets), and a measure of risk captured by 
loan loss provisions to net interest revenue.  Banks may be influenced in M&As for 
regulatory reasons or as a means to transfer risk which may therefore influence investment 
returns (Amihud et al, 2002; Valkanov and Kleimeier, 2006; Buch and DeLong, 2008).  
Furthermore, given the differences observed in the dividend payout between domestic and 
cross-border acquirers, we also investigate its possible impact on value creation at the time of 
announcement.
2
  The dependent variable is the cumulative standardized abnormal return 
(CSAR) and the cross-sectional multivariate regression follows the basic linear model 
 
   ii FCSAR 0  
 
where the i  coefficients represent the effect of independent financial variables iF ,  and i  
is the error term.  As the number of domestic deals in the sample is limited, we run the 
regression on the combined sample and distinguish the effect of domestic and cross-border 
acquirers using a dummy variable.  We check for multicollinearity using the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) and correct for heteroskedasticity using a form of weighted least 
squares.  
 
Table 4 presents the results of two regressions. Model 1 considers the influence of return on 
assets, return on equity, and the cost-to-income ratio, representing the operating efficiency of 
the acquirer in determining shareholder value. Model 2 adds the influence of additional 
factors, including risk, capitalization and dividend payout. The object of estimating these two 
models is to consider whether the influence of operating efficiency (profit and cost) is 
affected by the inclusion of other factors.  In both cases the regression results are shown with 
“standardized” beta coefficients which depict the relative contribution of the financial factors 
on M&A value.
3
  This effectively amounts to using weighted least squares which is 
qualitatively similar to OLS but additionally corrects for heterogeneity in the cross-section 
                                                   
2 Olson and Pagano (2005) account for the influence of dividend payout ratio as an economically significant 
determinant on merged banks longer run (buy and hold) stock return performance for the US. 
3
 The standardized coefficients suppress the effect of the intercept term without affecting the significance of the 
estimates, as the regressions are based on transformed variables that are weighted around their means by their 
respective standard deviations.  As such the regression results depict the relative contribution of the explanatory 
variables to variations in the dependent variable (see, e.g. Gujarati, 2005) 
 
data.  Since the excess returns are estimated values, the use of weighted least squares (with 
the inverse of the standard deviation as the weighting scheme) is preferred to OLS (Campa 
and Hernando, 2006). Along with the standardized coefficient estimates and their 
significance values we also present the partial correlations of the explanatory variables and 
their collinearity statistics (as represented by the variance inflation factor) to indicate that 
there is no apparent multicollinearity problem affecting the significance of the estimates.
4
 
 
The coefficient estimates reveal the significance of the return on equity and the cost-to-
income ratio in both regressions, both of which have a negative impact on acquirers’ returns.  
This suggests that higher cost and profitability of the acquirer has a negative impact on value 
creation, which renders support for the low efficiency hypothesis that implies the need for 
management to implement restructuring for potential cost reduction and further improvement 
of profitability (Akhavien et al, 1997).   The influence of acquirer’s cost inefficiency is more 
significant than profitability in this context.  The only other significant determinant is the 
equity/asset ratio suggesting that the capital strength of the acquiring bank affects shareholder 
value at the time of the announcement, consistent with the economic intuition that well 
capitalised, more leveraged banks are susceptible to greater degree of investor sentiment.  
Other factors, such as the risk exposure of the acquiring bank and its dividend payout have no 
explanatory power on shareholder returns at the time of the announcement.  Despite the pre 
and post-merger differences observed in the dividend payout ratio between domestic and 
cross-border deals, the influence of the dividend payout is insignificant in affecting 
shareholder returns.  However, this finding may be explained by the relatively short period 
abnormal returns we consider at the time of announcement, where as the impact of dividend 
policy is found to be significant in affecting accounting based measures of long run stock 
return performance of US bank mergers (Olson and Pagano, 2005).    
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has analysed the difference between the announcement period acquirer returns 
from cross-border and domestic bank M&As in the European Union.  The study has focused 
                                                   
4
 Generally, high correlations among the explanatory variables would indicate high partial correlations and a 
high variance inflation factor (VIF).   
  
on bank mega-mergers with deal values of over £1 billion.  We find that such mega-M&As 
among publicly traded banks have been more significant in recent years, with more cross-
border mergers relative to domestic ones, reflecting a growing trend towards cross-border 
banking consolidation in recent years. 
 
Using an event windows approach, we calculate abnormal returns for acquiring banks in 62 
transactions that occurred between 1997 and 2007, of which 19 (31%) are domestic and 43 
(69%) are cross-border.  Our study takes a step further from previous studies on EU bank 
M&As by considering a longer time span for the event window in capturing the market 
reaction to announcement of mergers and by incorporating standardised abnormal returns in 
estimating shareholder value, to account for different degrees of event impact in the sample 
covering different EU countries.  In a second step we also analyse the impact of specific 
acquirer characteristics on their returns using multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis. 
 
Our finding is generally consistent with comparable studies in that domestic transactions 
yield relatively better returns for acquirers than cross-border transactions (Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia, 2000; Beital et al, 2004; Campa and Hernando, 2004; Lensink and Maslennikova, 
2007; Ongena and Penas, 2008).  However, our results show significantly negative 
cumulative abnormal returns to acquirers in cross-border tansactions, while the returns in 
domestic transactions are marginally negative but insignificant.  Thus we do not find 
evidence that bank M&As create shareholder value for the acquirers, and the returns for 
cross-border mergers for most days of the event window are also significantly negative.  
Given that most of the deals in our sample are among the developed countries of the EU, we 
associate this result to possible pre-existing conditions in the host market, suggesting 
difficulties that acquiring banks face in turning around the fortunes of acquired banks (Peek 
et al, 1999; Berger et al, 2000).   Thus potential downside risks are judged by market 
participants to outweigh the potential benefits from cross-border M&As in the EU retail 
banking market.  One of the downside risks, consistent with our finding from cross-sectional 
regression, is the acquirers’ ability to implement restructuring for cost management and 
profitability on the acquired bank, which attracts a negative market reaction at the time of 
announcement.   Our analysis of the results suggests that geographical diversification in 
banking, while important for cross-border banking sector consolidation in the EU, is not 
rewarding for shareholders of acquiring banks. 
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Table 1: Value of Bank M&As deals by year, 1997-2007  
Year 
No of 
M&As Mean (£) Std. Deviation 
1997 2 1,407,231.00 405553.00 
1998 6 4,097,761.00 2897554.00 
1999 2 1,212,734.00 46858.00 
2000 5 1,759,680.00 3117856.00 
2001 7 3,762,230.00 309369.00 
2002 5 2,163,284.00 265620.00 
2003 4 4,122,661.00 591491.00 
2004 10 17,012,874.00 8083640.00 
2005 7 4,837,064.00 6322846.00 
2006 9 4,358,766.00 9309091.00 
2007 5 9,393,899.00 13184187.00 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Mega-M&As within EU countries, 1997-2007 (deal values over of £1bn) 
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Table 2   Summary Statistics of M&As in Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Domestic(£’000)   
Cross 
border(£’000)   
 Pre mergers Mean SD Mean SD 
Total assets 135,561,649 122,102,150 295,774,836 106,955,579 
total capital ratio 10,069 568 11,282 764 
operating costs 4,624,813 1,207,331 4,809,116 2,434,091 
total staff costs 2,410,752 2,549,229 3,173,842 435,890 
total income 6,437,453 1,352,289 6,698,628 2,626,515 
costs income ratio 77.71 4.14 73.94 3 
return on total assets 
(ROA) 0.68 0.2 0.59 0.22 
total assets/ equity 25.38 2.07 26.06 2.27 
return on equity 
(ROE) 10.77 2.02 13.03 2 
ordinary share 
dividend paid 33,977,266 25,031,718 859,614 351,912 
Post mergers     
Total assets 301,910,012 122,074,329 403,465,081 186,452,988 
total capital ratio 10,599 1,090 10,556 1,017 
operating costs 21,558,160 20,909,312 8,422,235 4,393,688 
total staff costs 5,107,105 2,528,289 4,835,667 1,770,800 
total income 13,982,734 6,854,933 15,437,432 4,527,017 
costs income ratio 75.45 4.28 76.32 5 
return on total assets 
(ROA) 0.3 0.5 0.61 0.14 
total assets/ equity 27.2 5.02 30.35 3.62 
return on equity 
(ROE) 9.74 4.01 13.22 4 
ordinary share 
dividend paid 24,142,874 21,882,102 10,845,026 11,577,131 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Returns (Cross-border deals) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Returns (Domestic Deals) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 3: Announcement Period Returns of Cross Border & Domestic M&A 
 
Event 
days 
CSAR+ Z-stat P-Value  Event 
days 
CSAR Z-Stat P-Value 
-30 -12.25   
(-0.74)# 
-2.86 
 (-0.16) 
0.004* 
(-0.87) 
 18 -34.14 
(-10.35) 
-2.80 
(-0.50) 
0.005* 
(0.61) 
-26 20.78 
(1.87) 
2.17 
(0.38) 
0.030* 
(0.71) 
 21 -27.37 
(-5.86) 
-2.18 
(-0.32) 
0.030* 
(0.75) 
-25 29.02 
(5.14) 
2.76 
(0.91) 
0.006* 
(0.36) 
 22 -33.82 
(-7.39) 
-2.37 
(-0.38) 
0.018* 
(0.71) 
-12 -38.19 
(-6.01) 
-3.11 
(-0.49) 
0.002* 
(0.63) 
 23 -25.37 
(-8.85) 
-2.07 
(-0.49) 
0.038* 
(0.62) 
-11 -25.38 
(-6.3) 
-2.89 
(0.33) 
0.004* 
(0.74) 
 25 -28.09 
(-9.101) 
-2.43 
(-0.38) 
0.015* 
(0.70) 
10 -28.03 
(-4.63) 
-2.27 
(-0.33) 
0.023* 
(0.74) 
 26 -26.61 
(-11.63) 
-2.68 
(-0.52) 
0.008* 
(0.60) 
11 -32.03 
(-5.57) 
-2.23 
(-0.3) 
0.026* 
(0.77) 
 27 -30.57 
(-14.62) 
-2.47 
(-0.58) 
0.014* 
(0.56) 
12 -34.81 
(-8.5) 
-2.66 
(-0.45) 
0.008* 
(0.65) 
 28 -39.90 
(-16.86) 
-3.03 
(-0.69) 
0.002* 
(0.49) 
13 -38.6 
(-12.9) 
-2.83 
(-0.68) 
0.004* 
(0.5) 
 29 -38.41 
(-18.33) 
-2.96 
(-0.75) 
0.003* 
(0.45) 
14 -27.3 
(11.43) 
-2.51 
(-0.59) 
0.012* 
(0.55) 
 30 -25.23 
(-21.44) 
-2.25 
(-0.98) 
0.024* 
(0.33) 
15 -28.2 
(11.93) 
-2.79 
(-0.66) 
0.005* 
(0.51) 
     
16 -24.7 
(11.61) 
-2.88 
(-0.66) 
0.003* 
(0.51) 
     
17 -41.5 
(-8.6) 
-3.42 
(-0.47) 
0.006* 
(0.64) 
     
*Significant at 5% level. Only significant returns are shown.                                                            
#Figures in parentheses are for domestic deals                                                                                             
+ Cumulative standardized abnormal returns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4        Cross sectional Regression results  
The dependent variable is CSAR of acquirers, measured on (-30,+30) days interval around the announcement day.  The 
independent variables are:  return on total assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), cost to income ratio (COSINCR), 
operational costs (OPCOST), total income (TINCOME), equity/total assets (EQTASS), loan loss provisions to net interest 
revenue (RISK), and dividend payout (DIV).  The DUMMY variable takes the value of 1 for cross border and 0 for 
domestic deals.   
 
 
Coefficients  
Model 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Beta Partial Part VIF 
1 (Constant)  7.968 .000    
ROA .187 3.034 .403 .300 .232 1.530 
COSINCR -.521 -5.713 .000** -.510 -.436 1.429 
ROE -.156 -3.676 .251** -.356 -.281 1.609 
2 (Constant)  7.432 .000    
ROA .112 2.240 .328 .229 .164 1.657 
COSINCR -.518 -6.634 .000** -.571 -.487 1.611 
ROE -.187 -4.132 .259** -.397 -.303 1.628 
TINCOME -.141 -1.582 .117 -.164 -.116 1.477 
EQTASS .682 4.011 .000** .105 .074 1.212 
RISK 
DIV 
-.059 
-.128 
-.783 
-2.721 
.436 
.503 
-.082 
-.024 
-.057 
-.128 
1.065 
1.117 
 
OPCOST 
-.324 -2.685 .009* -.271 -.197 1.298 
DUMMY -.139 -1.647 .103 -.170 -.121 1.319 
 
**Significant at 0.01%; *Significant at 0.05% 
 
     
 
